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 What is the nature of corruption in Western democracies? 
To answer this research question, the authors study 10 
Dutch corruption cases in depth, looking at conﬁ dential 
criminal ﬁ les. Th e cases allow them to sketch a general 
proﬁ le of a corruption case. Th e authors oﬀ ers nine propo-
sitions to portray the nature of corruption. Th ey conclude 
that corruption usually takes place within enduring 
relationships, that the process of becoming corrupt can 
be characterized as a slippery slope, and that important 
motives for corruption, aside from material gain, include 
friendship or love, status, and the desire to impress others. 
Th e explorative multiple case study methodology helps to 
expand our understanding of the way in which oﬃ  cials 
become corrupt. 
 W  hat is the nature of corruption? Before we can address our main research question, we must ﬁ rst answer another question: 
How can the nature of corruption best be studied? We 
argue here that more  qualitative, contextually based 
research on corruption is needed (also important for 
anticorruption policies), research with special atten-
tion to the necessary and suﬃ  cient conditions of 
corruption in a particular case. 
 In this article, 10 Dutch corruption cases are studied 
in depth. One of the things the explorative case study 
design allows us to do is study  the way in which some 
public oﬃ  cials become corrupt. Th e study leads to 
nine propositions on the nature of corruption. 
 The Importance of Context 
 Something about the nature of corruption can be 
learned from the numerous quantitative studies that 
have been done on the correlations between certain 
variables and corruption (for a 
good overview, see  Jain 2001; 
Lambsdorﬀ  1999 ). A substan-
tial amount of literature states 
the conditions of culture and 
the structure of organizations 
under which corruption is 
more likely to occur. For 
 example,  La Porta et al. (1999) found a positive correla-
tion between total government transfers and subsidies 
(total redistributive activity) and corruption;  Treisman 
(2000) found a positive impact of state intervention 
on corruption; and trust has been negatively corre-
lated with corruption ( La Porta et al. 1997 ). Th is list 
of examples is by no means comprehensive. 
 However, in much correlation and regression re-
search on corruption, corrupt behavior seems to be 
caused by factors beyond individual control. Corrup-
tion is studied outside its own unique context. In a 
sense, the corrupt agent “disappears” along with the 
corruption that is being studied (cf.  Schinkel 2004, 
6 ). Th is leads to the study of factors or variables that 
are certainly relevant to our understanding of the 
nature of corruption, but it draws attention away 
from the corrupt practices and the corrupt agent. 
Quantitative research does not seem to tell the whole 
story about the nature of corruption; it necessarily 
ignores the characteristics and details of the context 
of each corruption case. Quantitative research cannot 
account for contingency, which is so important for 
social research — especially corruption research —
 because of the complexity of the phenomenon of 
corruption. It also says little about the causes of 
corruption (De  Graaf 2006 ). After all, something of 
the agent “has to be retained in order not to lapse 
into an endless teleology without Telos of causes 
causing other causes serving other causes and so 
forth” ( Schinkel 2004, 6 – 7 ). Even though most 
research shows that there is a strong negative correla-
tion, for example, between gross domestic product 
and corruption, no causality can be derived from this 
( Lambsdorﬀ  1999 ); correlations do not provide 
causal links. Furthermore, quanti-
tative research seldom leads to 
clear policy advice. How do we 
curb corruption and make anti-
corruption policies by simply 
knowing that poverty causes 
corruption? Currently, there is 
much confusion in the literature 
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 La Porta . . . found a positive 
correlation between total 
government transfers and 
subsidies (total redistributive 
activity) and corruption. 
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about which anticorruption methods work under 
what conditions ( Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996 ). 1 
 Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) point to the possible 
trade-oﬀ  between imposing strict controls on the 
behavior of oﬃ  cials and the costs of these controls in 
eﬃ  ciency and innovativeness. 
 Detailed case studies of corrupt oﬃ  cials, the method 
chosen for this article, allow the researcher to study 
the  process through which people become corrupt. As 
a result, the case study methodology adds to quantita-
tive research. According to Anechiarico and Jacobs, 
“Using focus groups and case studies would generate a 
mass of data that, when analyzed and organized, will 
probably provide a way to move forward with policy 
experiments” (1996, 198). In case studies, attention 
can be paid to the individuals within their culture and 
organization. In this article, corruption cases are stud-
ied within their context, which means research in the 
tradition of  Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996), Della 
Porta and Vannucci (1997), and Höﬄ  ing (2002) . 
Research methods used in this tradition include judi-
cial investigations, interviews, and newspaper-based 
data banks (cf.  Ahmad and Brookins 2004 ). 
 Corruption, the central concept of our study, must be 
deﬁ ned before the research methodology can be ex-
plained. Great attention has been paid in the literature 
to the question of what corruption “is” (e.g.,  Alemann 
2004; Génaux 2004; Rose-Ackerman 1999 ). Th e 
phenomenon has been interpreted and deﬁ ned in 
many ways. Insightful contributions on this include 
the pioneering work of  Hoetjes (1982, 1998, 2000) in 
the Netherlands and, internationally, that of  Bull and 
Newell (2003), Caiden (1991, 
2001), Heidenheimer and 
Johnston (2002), Heywood 
(1997) , and  Sherman (1974) . 
Here, we use the following 
deﬁ nition: Public oﬃ  cials are 
corrupt when they act (or fail 
to act) as a result of receiving 
personal rewards from interested 
outside parties ( Huberts and 
Nelen 2005 ). Th is deﬁ nition has been leading in the 
empirical research that we will present. An important 
element of the deﬁ nition is that, in this article, 
corruption always includes an interested third party. 
An accountant who steals (without help from other 
people) from her organization, for example, would 
be seen as committing fraud, not corruption. Also 
important is the element of “personal rewards,” which 
include nonmonetary rewards, and the consideration 
that, as a result of these personal rewards, an act (or 
failure to act) of a public oﬃ  cial is inﬂ uenced. 
 In much of the literature (e.g.,  Fijnaut and Huberts 
2002 ), a distinction is made between the nature of 
corruption in lower-income countries and in higher-
income countries; low salaries and poor working 
conditions greatly improve the chances of corrupt 
instances. Here, we concentrate on corruption in 
high-income countries, where it is much the exception 
to behavior ( Caiden 2001 , 27). All the data come 
from the Netherlands. Th is means that the nature of 
corruption in this study is ﬁ rst of all about that coun-
try, but we see the cases as exemplifying the corrupt 
oﬃ  cial, his or her (organizational) situation, and his 
or her corrupt relationship in Western democracies: 
“high-income” societies with stable, highly institu-
tionalized political systems. Th erefore, the proposi-
tions coming out of the data will be compared with 
the relevant international literature. 
 Research Methodology 
 Because not much is known about the nature of cor-
ruption in high-income countries, an explorative and 
inductive research strategy was chosen (cf.  Eisenhardt 
1989; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Höﬄ  ing 2002 ). Spe-
ciﬁ cally, a multiple case study design was used, which 
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within 
single settings ( Eisenhardt 1989; Herriott and Firestone 
1983; Yin 1989 ) in order to generate theory in the 
shape of propositions ( Gersick 1988; Harris and 
Sutton 1986 ). Th is method is ﬁ tting when not 
much is known about the phenomenon that is being 
researched or when the phenomenon is so complex 
that neither the variables nor the exact relationship 
between the variables is fully deﬁ nable ( Hoesel 1985 ), 
as is the case in research on the nature of corruption. 
Case studies oﬀ er the advantage of richer details of 
actual cases and their contextuality. Coupled with the 
within-case analysis is a cross-case search for patterns 
( Eisenhardt 1989, 540 ). Doing a 
multiple case study conforms to 
the conclusion of Menzel after 
reviewing the body of empirical 
research conducted on ethics and 
integrity in governance: “Th e 
research strategies for ethics 
scholars should include greater 
methodological rigor with per-
haps less reliance on survey re-
search methods. Such rigor, of course, could include 
contextually rich case studies as well as trend or longi-
tudinal analyses that were largely absent from the 
studies examined in this paper” ( 2003 , 35). 
 Selection of the Cases 
 In this article, each case represents one corrupt public 
oﬃ  cial and includes all the wrongdoings of that indi-
vidual. Th e cases for this research were selected from 
the ﬁ les of the National Police Internal Investigation 
Department, known in the Netherlands as  Rijksrecherche, 
or RR. Th e RR plays a leading role in investigating 
corruption in the Netherlands. When the public 
prosecutor in the Netherlands is confronted with a 
corruption case, he or she usually notiﬁ es the 
 “Th e research strategies for 
ethics scholars should include 
greater methodological rigor 
with perhaps less reliance on 
survey research methods . . .” 
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Coordination Commission of the RR (CCR). 2 
Th erefore, all more or less important corruption cases 
in the Netherlands are evaluated by the CCR. Th e 
commission then determines whether independent 
investigation by the RR is warranted. 
 Between 2000 and 2003, 30 instances of suspected 
corruption (according to the deﬁ nition given earlier) 
were ﬁ led. We put aside active ﬁ les (to avoid any 
inﬂ uence on ongoing investigations) and those that 
were dismissed because no evidence of corruption 
was found. Of the remaining 12 ﬁ les, three were 
rejected. One involved an accused oﬃ  cial who had 
worked at a Dutch embassy on another continent; 
the other two ﬁ les could not be located at the time of 
the research. Of the nine studied ﬁ les, one involved 
numerous suspected oﬃ  cials. In this particular ﬁ le, 
two oﬃ  cials (who did not know each other) were 
studied individually, meaning that, in total, 10 cor-
ruption cases were studied. Th is is an acceptable 
number, according to Eisenhardt: “[W]hile there is 
no ideal number of cases, a number between 4 and 
10 cases usually works well . . . With more than 
10 cases, it quickly becomes diﬃ  cult to cope with 
the complexity and volume of the data” (1989, 545). 
Given the way the 10 cases were selected, they should 
be characteristic of the more important corruption 
cases that are being discovered and investigated in the 
Netherlands.  Table  1 characterizes the positions of the 
10 public oﬃ  cials. 
 Research Techniques 
 As can be seen in  table  1 , all of the corruption cases 
took place in sectors known to be vulnerable to cor-
ruption: immigration and naturalization; police; 
embassy; and housing, spatial planning, and infra-
structure ( Hoetjes 1998; Klitgaard 1988 ). Th e activi-
ties expected by the external party (the briber) of the 
oﬃ  cial were not surprising either: two policemen sold 
conﬁ dential information; three oﬃ  cials misused 
power in decisions involving immigration status or 
visas; ﬁ ve oﬃ  cials favored external parties in the pro-
cess of granting contracts and commissions. Eight of 
these oﬃ  cials were male; two were female. Th eir ages 
ranged between 25 and 65. Th e cases were spread 
throughout the Netherlands. 
 On average, researching the criminal ﬁ les of each case 
required two days. Th e ﬁ les contained various types of 
information, such as taped telephone conversations, 
oﬃ  cial reports, suspect interrogations, and witness 
interviews. Th e last two, in which the suspects and 
their respective organizations were extensively dis-
cussed, proved especially helpful to this study. Also, 
15 interviews were conducted with the respective case 
detectives and their superiors to gain more insight 
into the accused oﬃ  cials and their organizational 
context. In addition, we studied all available public 
sources, such as newspaper articles and verdicts of the 
court. 
 Heuristic of the Research 
 To ﬁ nd cross-case patterns, Eisenhardt suggests using 
techniques that force investigators to go beyond initial 
impressions: 
 Overall, the idea behind these cross-case search-
ing tactics is to force investigators to go beyond 
initial impressions, especially through the use of 
structured and diverse lenses on the data. Th ese 
tactics improve the likelihood of accurate and 
reliable theory, that is, a theory with a close ﬁ t 
with the data. Also, cross-case searching tech-
niques enhance the possibility that the investi-
gators will capture the novel ﬁ ndings which 
may exist in the data. (1989, 541) 
 Usually, researchers in multiple case studies face 
immense quantities of data. Here, we followed the 
suggestion of  Miles and Huberman (1994) to use a 
“monster grid.” On one axis of the grid are the 10 
oﬃ  cials, and on the other are variables from a litera-
ture review that were determined to be useful to the 
study of the nature of corruption (important sources 
for the latter include  Hoetjes 1982, 1998; Höﬄ  ing 
2002; Huberts 1998; Nelen and Nieuwendijk 2003 ). 
 Hoetjes (1982) pointed to characteristics at the level 
of the individual, the group, the organization, soci-
ety, the economy, and public life as explanatory 
factors. 
 Th e option, however, of insights and novel ﬁ ndings 
based on other variables emerging from the data was 
left wide open. Th e cells of the grid are not ﬁ lled in 
with numbers but with verbal comments and cita-
tions ( Swanborn 2003, 16 ). From this grid, patterns 
(in the form of propositions) were derived, which 
were then juxtaposed with the empirical data. Th is 
inductive process was repeated many times before 
the ﬁ nal analysis was written. According to 
Eisenhardt, 
 Table  1  The 10 Cases 
 Number of Cases Position 
2 Employees of the National Immigration 
 and Naturalization Service 
2 Policemen 
2 Aldermen 
1 Employee of a European foreign 
 embassy 
1 Civil servant in the Service for Public 
 Buildings of the Department of 
 Housing, Spatial Planning and Envi
 ronmental Affairs 
1 Civil servant in the Department of Public 
 Works, head of the realization of the 
 works in a Dutch province 
1 Municipal ofﬁ cial in the sector of 
 spatial planning 
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 From the within-site analysis plus various 
cross-site tactics and overall impressions, tenta-
tive themes, concepts, and possibly even 
relationships emerge. Th e next step of this 
highly iterative process is to compare systemati-
cally the emergent frame with the evidence 
from each case in order to assess how well 
or poorly it ﬁ ts with case data. Th e central idea 
is that researchers constantly 
compare theory with data-
iterating toward a theory 
which closely ﬁ ts the data. 
A close ﬁ t is important to 
building good theory because 
it takes advantage of the new 
insights possible from the 
data and yields an empirically 
valid theory. (1989, 541) 
 In the reiterative process, seven expert interviews 
were used to gain maximum conﬁ dence in the exter-
nal validity of the propositions. 3 Th e experts were 
given a chance to comment on the propositions and 
research ﬁ ndings, helping to make sense of the data. 
Where possible, the propositions were compared 
with the existing literature on the nature of 
corruption. 
 To illustrate the ﬁ ndings, some details of the cases 
will be discussed. Unfortunately, anonymity 
requirements prevent an in-depth presentation of 
the case stories. 
 Structure of the Research Findings 
 In the remaining pages, the research ﬁ ndings on the 
nature of corruption derived from the 10 cases will 
be presented. Th e discussion is organized as follows: 
(1) the individual corrupt oﬃ  cial, (2) his or her 
organizational context, and (3) the relationship 
between the briber and the corrupt oﬃ  cial. At the 
beginning of each section, propositions emanating 
from the material will be presented. Th en the data 
from our study will be presented and discussed. 
Finally, we juxtapose the propositions with the exist-
ing knowledge (in the public ethics and corruption 
literature) about the nature of corruption in Western 
democracies. Th e body of research on corporate 
corruption (e.g.,  Ashforth and Anand 2003; Brief, 
Buttram, and Dukerich 2001 ) will be included, 
which is also (partly) covered in management 
studies under such concepts as “corporate illegality” 
(e.g.,  Baucus 1994 ), “organizational misbehavior” 
(e.g.,  Vardi and Weitz 2004 ), “unethical behavior in 
organizations” ( Brass, Butterﬁ eld, and Skaggs 1998 ), 
or “ethical decision making behavior” ( Treviño 
and Youngblood 1990 ), and in criminology under 
such concepts as “white collar crime” (e.g.,  Croall 
2001; Sutherland 1983; Weisburd et al. 1991 ), 
“occupational crime” (e.g.,  Clinard 1983 ), or 
“corporate crime” (e.g.,  Blankenship 1993; Shover 
and Bryant 1993 ). 
 Research Findings 
 The Individual 
 Motive.  Proposition 1:  Next to material gain, the 
most important motives for oﬃ  cials to become 
corrupt are friendship or love, 
status, and making an impres-
sion on colleagues and friends. 
 In eight of the corruption cases 
that were studied, material gain 
played a role. It is notable that in 
most of these cases, the ﬁ nancial 
reward was small. 4 Furthermore, 
in at least ﬁ ve of the eight cases, 
other motives played an impor-
tant role, especially a combination of achieving status 
and impressing others. In all of the cases, trust and 
friendship also played important roles. (We present 
more on this in the section on the relationship be-
tween the briber and the corrupt oﬃ  cial.) We did not 
ﬁ nd any evidence that the ﬁ nancial rewards were 
shared with colleagues to buy their silence. 
 In two cases, the corrupt oﬃ  cial acted out of 
nonpecuniary motives, namely, out of love or friend-
ship for the external actor. As we will discuss later, in 
the relationship between the corrupt oﬃ  cial and the 
briber, trust is important. What is notable in these 
two cases (both involving female oﬃ  cials) is that 
the relationship of trust was not used to transfer 
bribes; rather, the relationship was the bribe —
 friendship or love was the bribe. Th e following 
detective’s statement, which concerned a Dutch 
embassy oﬃ  cial who had issued visas on false 
grounds to her boyfriend’s friends, is typical: “She 
did it because of love for her boyfriend and perhaps 
a bit out of humanitarian motives. She just fell for 
the wrong guy who promised her a lot, like a mar-
riage that never came. She never received money for 
the corrupt acts. Her reward was love, if you can call 
it that.” 
 In the eight cases in which money played a role, it is 
notable that all involved men. In the two cases in 
which the corrupt oﬃ  cials were women, there are no 
indications of ﬁ nancial rewards. Th us, in this study, 
no corruption cases involving bribes were found with 
women as the main suspects. Th e interviews with 
detectives and experts indicate that the percentage of 
male suspects in corruption cases is much higher than 
one would expect on the basis of the male/female 
percentage split in sectors that are susceptible to 
corruption; in almost all criminal corruption investi-
gations involving pecuniary bribes, men are the 
suspects. 
 Next to material gain, the most 
important motives for oﬃ  cials 
to become corrupt are 
friendship or love, status, and 
making an impression on 
colleagues and friends. 
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 Th e ﬁ les oﬀ er little information on how the oﬃ  cials 
look back on their wrongful actions. But in those 
cases in which information was obtainable, the main 
complaint was, not surprisingly ( Ashforth and Anand 
2003; Sykes and Matza 1957 ), that the negative con-
sequences of their actions (court punishment, loss of 
job, loss of status) were disproportionate to the gains 
from their misconduct. Th e literature also shows that 
the agent rationalizes and legitimizes the corrupt 
behavior and does not regard it as corrupt. “One of 
the most intriguing ﬁ ndings in the white collar crime 
literature is that corrupt individuals tend not to view 
themselves as corrupt” ( Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi 
2004 , 40). All ﬁ ve types of neutralization techniques 
that perpetrators of crimes use to legitimize their 
behavior were found in the 10 cases ( Ashforth and 
Anand 2003; Sykes and Matza 1957 ). 
 Proposition 1 is not surprising. Earlier research has 
concluded that corrupt oﬃ  cials are not simply after 
material gain ( Nelen and Nieuwendijk 2003, 43 –
 44 ); the oﬃ  cial could also be seeking higher social 
standing, excitement, or an outlet for frustration. In 
the related literature, a few examples of antecedents 
mentioned as contributing to property deviance in 
organizations include feelings of frustration 
( Analoui and Kakabadse 1992 ), insecurity or bore-
dom ( Hoetjes 1998 ), dissatisfaction with work 
( Mangione and Quinn 1975 ), and feelings of injus-
tice ( Hollinger and Clark 1983 ). When discussing 
the motives of corrupt oﬃ  cials, a whole range of 
diﬀ erent and competing criminological theories can 
be applied to gain insight.  Cusson (1983) distin-
guished 13 goals of perpetrators of crimes; other 
theories, such as social control theories ( Hirschi 
1969 ), diﬀ erential association theories ( Sutherland 
1983 ), and rational choice theories ( Cornish and 
Clarke 1986 ), also pay attention to factors that can 
keep people from criminal activities. However, what 
is clear from the research using all these diﬀ erent 
criminological theories is that stating that the cor-
rupt oﬃ  cial is after material gain is an 
oversimpliﬁ cation. 
 Process of Becoming Corrupt.  Proposition 2: 
 Oﬃ  cials “slide down” toward corruption; most 
processes of becoming corrupt can be considered 
a slippery slope. 
 In almost every case studied here, the process of be-
coming corrupt can be characterized as a gradual one, 
a slippery slope. Granted, the oﬃ  cial has to jump the 
initial hurdle, but after the ﬁ rst corrupt act, corrup-
tion becomes easier to enter into, and it appears to be 
hard to stop the practice. During one interrogation, a 
detective painted a picture of an oﬃ  cial gradually 
sliding down the slope. Th e accused oﬃ  cial recognized 
himself in that picture. In the section on the relation-
ship between the briber and the corrupt oﬃ  cial, we 
shall see that corruption is rarely limited to one 
corrupt act. 
 Corruption rarely evolves from the personal prob-
lems — ﬁ nancial, for example — of the oﬃ  cial. In no 
case studied here was there a conscious cost – beneﬁ t 
calculation as to whether to accept bribes or not. Th e 
nature of the process was more a slippery slope, with 
eventual amazement and frustration regarding the 
oﬃ  cial’s behavior. Th ere is hardly any literature on the 
process of becoming corrupt in the public administra-
tion literature. In the corporate literature, however, the 
processes of becoming corrupt are very similar to the 
slippery slope metaphor (see, e.g., the process model 
of  Brief, Buttram, and Dukerich 2001 ). Compare the 
slippery slope metaphor with Darley: “Th e essence of 
the process involves causing individuals, under pres-
sure, to take small steps along a continuum that ends 
with evildoing. Each step is so small as to be essentially 
continuous with previous ones; after each step the 
individual is positioned to take the next one. Th e indi-
vidual’s morality follows rather than leads” ( 1992 , 208). 
 Character.  Proposition 3:  Often corrupt oﬃ  cials 
have dominant and strong personalities, know how to 
“get things done,” take or get the freedom to do things 
independently, and overstep formal boundaries of 
authority. 
 When we look at the characters of the 10 oﬃ  cials, it is 
no surprise that we notice many diﬀ erences among 
them. However, some common characteristics can be 
found (the diﬃ  culty of capturing a person’s personal-
ity in a few words notwithstanding). Of note is that 
most of the corrupt oﬃ  cials hardly seem to have dull 
personalities ( table  2 ). Most descriptions in  table  2 are 
quoted literally from the criminal ﬁ les of the sus-
pected oﬃ  cials and are primarily found in the ac-
counts of interrogations of witnesses, such as friends 
and colleagues. Some are from our interviews with the 
investigating detectives (who, of course, had intensive 
contact with the oﬃ  cials). 
 What is notable is that in seven of the 10 cases, the 
corrupt oﬃ  cials had strong and dominant personali-
ties. In two other cases ( table  2 , lines 7 and 8), the 
oﬃ  cials had less strong personalities, characterized by 
the desire to impress and sensitivity to status. Often 
the corrupt oﬃ  cials were described as “smooth talkers” 
who knew how to convince people. Other key words 
were “communicative,” “very direct,” “ﬂ amboyant,” 
“open,” and “ﬂ air.” Th e corrupt oﬃ  cials were the types 
of employees whom the organization could always call 
on because they had the characteristic of “being able 
to ﬁ x things”; they were more responsive than others 
(“I’ll take care of that for you”). A typical remark 
made by a former colleague of a suspected oﬃ  cial is as 
follows: “[He] was worth his weight in gold for the 
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team. He had many contacts and knew how to draw 
the right conclusions quickly.” 
 Within their organizations, the corrupt oﬃ  cials oper-
ated fairly independently, activity to which their organi-
zation or superiors did not object. Furthermore, they 
often eschewed rules and proper procedures, meaning 
they sought out boundaries of authority and formal 
competence. Whereas others, following proper proce-
dure, would have involved political authorities in deci-
sions, many of the corrupt oﬃ  cials tried to sidestep that. 
Notable, however, is that during their defense in court, 
their compliancy was brought back into the picture to 
prove that the corrupt act could not have taken place: 
“I’m innocent because I didn’t even have the authority 
to do what I’ve been accused of.” One convicted oﬃ  cial 
made a typical statement: “I had no formal authority to 
decide about granting contracts.” Earlier,  Braithwaite 
(1989) claimed that organizational structures are often 
contrived to insulate managers from blame, creating 
“plausible deniability” — for example, by a focus on 
performance goals coupled with minimal oversight 
and documentation ( Ashforth and Anand 2003 , 8). 
 Because the personalities of corrupt oﬃ  cials are hardly 
ever considered in quantitative research, not much is 
known about them (cf.  Nielsen 1984 ). Also in qualita-
tive research ( Ahmad and Brookins 2004; Anechiarico 
and Jacobs 1996; Della Porta and Vannucci 1997; 
Höﬄ  ing 2002 ), this aspect has received little atten-
tion. In the organizational misbehavior literature, 
however, signiﬁ cant relationships have been reported 
between certain personality traits and workplace de-
linquency ( Ashton 1998; Ford and Richardson 1994; 
Griﬃ  n, O’Leary, and Collins 1998; Raelin 1994; 
Treviño 1986 ). However, these studies focus mainly on 
variables such as cognitive moral development, locus of 
control, Machiavellianism, or low self-esteem — 
variables for which we have no data in our study. 
 Space to Maneuver.  Proposition 4:  More “business 
type” public oﬃ  cials brings the risk of more corruption. 
 In many ﬁ les, colleagues in the corrupt oﬃ  cial’s direct 
surroundings found the oﬃ  cial’s overstepping of the 
boundaries of authority remarkable but decided not to 
report anything or speak to their superiors. What 
might have played a role in this decision was the cor-
rupt oﬃ  cial’s popularity among his or her colleagues. 
Th e corrupt oﬃ  cials were often controversial, but they 
were also popular. One reason for this was that 
“they’re easy going.” In general, the corrupt oﬃ  cials 
did their jobs eﬀ ectively and eﬃ  ciently; because they 
got the job done, they commanded respect. Th is, in 
turn, created space to maneuver and perhaps to act 
corruptly within that less-controlled space. Reporting 
suspicions of wrongdoing colleagues is presented more 
fully in the next section. 
 Critics of New Public Management warn against 
certain types of managers in public administration. 
Th e type of corrupt oﬃ  cial described in this section —
 the one who places value on having informal author-
ity and results — ﬁ ts with the type of manager that 
New Public Management calls for. In the literature, 
many scholars have warned that introducing manage-
ment styles from the private sector into the public 
sector also introduces the danger of corruption and 
integrity violations ( Bovens 1996; Frederickson 1997; 
Gregory 1999; Hoetjes 1991; Jacobs 1992; Wittmer 
2000 ). In that light, it is interesting that the type of 
manager who is focused on results is typical in our 
10 corruption cases. 
 The Organization 
 Supervision.  Proposition 5:  In most corruption 
cases, supervision of the corrupt oﬃ  cial is not strong. 
 In each of the criminal ﬁ les of the 10 cases, com-
plaints can be found about the direct superior’s or 
the organization’s executives’ failing to supervise the 
corrupt oﬃ  cial. In the corrupt aldermen’s cases, there 
 Table  2  The Personalities of the 10 Corrupt Ofﬁ cials 
 Comments 
1 A very conscientious woman, very knowledgeable 
 in her department.Very neat and friendly, but she 
 did keep a slight distance from her colleagues. 
 She changed dramatically in a short period. 
2 Very noticeable. Someone who liked to be the center 
 of attention.
Extravert.
Extravert clothing. 
3 A dominant man. 
4 When there was a problem — with the politicians, for 
 example — he took care of it. 
5 A dominant man. Much focused on material things 
 and appearance.
He had an enormous persuasive force.
A hard worker.
As a friend , he could be very sympathetic.
Hot-tempered, can explode at any minute. 
6 Works hard, also for his own political party.
Does much on his own, is a macho, a colorful person.
His political position was his life.
Manipulated many things in his life. 
7 A good, “enthusiastic” ofﬁ cial.
Works very independently. Macho, likes to make an 
 impression.
Likes ﬁ tness, broad shouldered, muscular, always a 
 suntan, often with sunglasses.
Likes gadgets. 
8 Macho.
Likes Bullterriers and reptiles. 
9 A quiet family man, spends a lot of time with his family.
A sly dog. A fast and smooth talker. 
10 Loves luxury goods, gadgets, Jaguars, art.
Always sharply dressed.
Very polite and complacent.
Has a ready ﬂ ow of words, and is very patient 
 and convincing.
Vain, intelligent, and strong personality. 
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were many complaints about a weak city council and/
or mayor and fellow aldermen; in the cases of the civil 
servants, there were complaints about the direct line 
managers. In one case, management asked the (even-
tually corrupt) oﬃ  cial to be careful about having 
private contact with his business associates. In another 
case, the corrupt oﬃ  cial was asked to make a list of his 
additional jobs. In both cases, the oﬃ  cials ignored the 
requests, management forgot about them, and the 
action was therefore inconsequential. As one inter-
viewee said of a corrupt oﬃ  cial, “My former colleague 
was not under enough control of management. Th ey 
just let him be. In our organization, there were no 
clear rules on how to be held accountable for one’s 
responsibilities. He was poorly directed by his superi-
ors; otherwise, he would not have become corrupt.” 
Indeed, in several ﬁ les, the corrupt oﬃ  cials themselves 
complained about their former superiors; they felt 
they had not been adequately protected by their supe-
riors from the seductions of wrongdoing. 
 In no case did the organization pay much attention to 
integrity policies. Integrity was not an issue — at least 
not until the corruption case surfaced. Th is is remark-
able, as all the cases took place in sectors that are 
known to be vulnerable to corruption. 
 Proposition 5 comes out of the 10 corruption cases 
and is ﬁ rmly rooted in the literature. Th e involvement 
of leadership and supervision is considered of highest 
importance to prevent corruption, as is setting a good 
example (e.g.,  Ford and Richardson 1994; Hoetjes 
1982, 1998; Petrick and Quinn 1997; Treviño et al. 
1999 ). According to Ashforth and Anand, “Leaders 
do not have to actually engage in corruption to serve 
as role models: rewarding, condoning, ignoring, or 
otherwise facilitating corruption — whether intention-
ally or not, or explicitly or not — often sends a clear 
signal to employees” (2003, 7). What is also notice-
able is that the control procedures were inadequate in 
most of the 10 cases. In the organizational misbehav-
ior literature,  Ackroyd and Th ompson (1999) have 
stated that employee misconduct is mostly the result 
of oppressive as well as lax controls. 
 Organizational Structure.  Proposition 6:  In most 
corruption cases, management has not promoted a 
clear integrity policy. 
 Th ere were many diﬀ erences between the organiza-
tions studied and their structures — hardly surprising, 
as among them were police organizations, municipali-
ties, the central government. and an embassy. Yet 
certain mechanisms that have to do with control in 
the organizations are notable. In several cases, the 
administrative organization was not in order or was 
not taken seriously. A colleague of a suspected oﬃ  cial 
said, “We had much freedom in our work. Procedures 
were sidestepped; there was not much control, et 
cetera. Th is gave [him] the opportunity to do what he 
did. Now, rules have been sharpened. Now it’s not 
possible anymore.” 
 Control was inadequate in every organization. In 
several cases, civil servants were, independent of 
anyone else in the organization, able to decide on 
matters of great importance to external parties, such 
as granting construction contracts or issuing green 
cards. In the few cases in which a formal control 
system was in place, in practice it was merely titular. 
In many of the cases, the civil servant had held the 
same position for a long time. Furthermore, as 
noticed earlier, in most cases, there was no clear 
accountability. 
 To explain the failure of control, the criminal ﬁ les 
many times refer to “special circumstances of the 
organization.” Th e National Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (IND), for example, grew 
substantially in a relative short period of time, 
leading to high work pressure and tensions. In other 
cases, leadership changed many times (and therefore 
employees hardly knew who was who in the organiza-
tion), or there was high political tension that lead to 
mistrust and confusion. A factor mentioned many 
times is that pressure to perform was high in the 
organization. For example, many houses had to be 
built in a municipality in a relatively short time. 
Th e responsible civil servants received signals 
from their political superiors that the speed of the 
decision process was more important than its quality. 
Apparently, this makes an organization vulnerable to 
corruption. In another case, the failure to control was 
the result of a recent retrenchment policy that had 
cut several control functions. 
 Many scholars have pled for integrity policies in gov-
ernmental organizations. However, what such a policy 
should exactly entail diﬀ ers from scholar to scholar 
(see  Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996; Pope 2000 ; for an 
interesting case study on the management of integrity 
that goes beyond ethical codes, Van  Blijswijk et al. 
2004 ). 
 Organizational Culture.  Proposition 7:  Because 
of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to 
report suspicions of another’s corrupt activities. 
 Much information of the needed to adequately char-
acterize the culture of the organizations was absent 
from the criminal ﬁ les. However, something can be 
said about certain aspects of organizational culture 
that are mentioned in the literature as relevant to 
corruption. 
 What is notable in the 10 cases is the ﬁ rmness of the 
relationships between the corrupt oﬃ  cials and their 
bribers. In many of the cases, it was considered quite 
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normal within public organizations for oﬃ  cials to 
have close relationships with external parties who 
had interests in their decisions. One interviewee 
noted that even though the police had strict rules 
about association with external parties (such as 
meeting criminal suspects when oﬀ  duty), for other 
civil servants, these rules did not exist. For civil 
servants in charge of procurement, for example, 
playing golf with contractors was not considered a 
problem. Many in our sample argued that it is very 
important to “maintain good relationships with 
external parties.” 5 
 As mentioned earlier, in most organizations, signals 
of something “irregular” surfaced before the corrup-
tion case was discovered. Yet these signals were 
somehow not properly dealt with. In organizations 
with a culture in which breaking rules and receiving 
gifts from external parties is considered normal, it is 
not surprising that internal signals of integrity 
violations are ignored. (In the next section, we call 
this “corrupt networks.”) But in seven cases, the 
corrupt oﬃ  cials operated independently. Colleagues 
were kept out of it as much as possible. In those 
cases, suspicions about the oﬃ  cial’s direct organiza-
tional environment existed, but they were not re-
ported or passed on to superiors. From the 
interrogations of colleagues of the suspected oﬃ  -
cials, it becomes clear that collegial loyalty and 
solidarity play a major role in the decision not to 
talk about or report any suspicions of wrongdoing. 
To accuse a colleague, even with evidence, is not 
something that is taken lightly. A former colleague 
of an accused oﬃ  cial said, 
 Certain things I found very strange and I talked 
to a colleague about it. I told him that we 
should do something about it, for example, tell 
our superior; otherwise, we ourselves might be 
doing something wrong. He disagreed and told 
me that it was the responsibility of [the sus-
pected oﬃ  cial] himself. After that conversation 
I did nothing. I should note that three other 
colleagues, namely . . ., also saw what I saw. 
Th ey also felt that it was the responsibility 
of [the suspected oﬃ  cial] 
himself. 
 And as one detective said, “Often 
when investigating a corruption 
case, we hear from the colleagues 
of the suspected oﬃ  cial, ‘I am 
not in the least surprised.’” 
 Th e detectives of the RR also 
complained that cooperation is 
not always entirely forthcoming 
from the leadership and organization of an accused 
oﬃ  cial. Th is, they note, is something that has 
changed over the last 20 years. According to the 
detectives, managers in the public sector see them-
selves, more than they used to, as representatives of 
their organization rather than representatives of the 
public sector. Loyalty toward the organization and its 
members is greater than loyalty toward the “public 
interest.” In several cases, there were strong indica-
tions that the leadership of the organization of the 
accused oﬃ  cial feared negative press and therefore 
thwarted the investigation. In one case, leadership 
backed the accused for a long time, impeding the 
investigation. 
 In the literature, much has been written about loyalty 
and solidarity in police organizations (e.g.,  Crank and 
Caldero 2000; Ewin 1990; Punch 1985; Skolnick 
2002 ). Sometimes called a “code of silence,” it is 
known to prevent the reporting of fellow wrongdoing. 
Th e literature on the reporting of integrity violations 
within organizations generally concurs that loyalty 
and solidarity are important factors inﬂ uencing the 
reporting of wrongdoing of colleagues (e.g.,  Gorta 
and Forell 1995; Lee, Heimann, and Near 2004; 
Treviño and Victor 1992; Zipparo 1999 ). Th e same 
conclusions have been formulated in the literature on 
whistle-blowers (e.g.,  Greenberger, Miceli, and Cohen 
1987; Miceli and Near 1984; Near and Miceli 1986 ). 
Th is is conﬁ rmed in the 10 cases studied here. In the 
Netherlands,  Nelen and Nieuwendijk (2003, 58) 
have noted that in organizational cultures in which 
coworker relations are characterized by loyalty, 
nonintervention, and conﬂ ict avoidance, the working 
of internal and external rules on integrity issues might 
be signiﬁ cantly impeded. 
 The Relationship between the Briber and the 
Corrupt Ofﬁ cial 
 The Exchange of Favors; the Length, Initiative, 
and Nature of the Relationship; and the Interests 
of Bribers.  Proposition 8:  Th e relationship between 
briber and the oﬃ  cial is most often enduring. 
 Strikingly, the corrupt oﬃ  cial rarely receives a gift 
for which concrete compensation is expected. 6 In 
almost all cases, there was no 
clear quid pro quo. Th e classic 
image of an oﬃ  cial receiving an 
envelope full of money with one 
hand while signing with his or 
her other hand a wrongly inﬂ u-
enced resolution holds no accu-
racy in any of the cases. A 
former contractor (a briber who 
became a whistle-blower) ex-
plained in one of the ﬁ les: 
“With [the corrupt oﬃ  cial], we 
had a gentleman’s agreement. He was allowed to do 
all kinds of nice things at our expense, and, without 
 According to the detectives, 
managers in the public sector 
see themselves, more than they 
used to, as representatives of 
their organization rather 
than representatives of the 
public sector. 
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explicating it, he was expected to make decisions 
which favored us. I never discussed it with him 
speciﬁ cally.” 
 In such an agreement, it is hard to deﬁ ne what is 
expected of the oﬃ  cial. Th is is one of the main prob-
lems for the detectives of the RR: Th ey have to prove 
what the corrupt oﬃ  cial did wrong in exchange for 
the gifts, the quid pro quo. 7 
 In nine of the 10 cases, there was a long, institutional-
ized relationship between the briber and corrupt 
oﬃ  cial. In only one case did the oﬃ  cial have several 
short and superﬁ cial contacts with the bribers. 
 In the latter case, an IND oﬃ  cial issued green cards 
and arranged marriages on false premises. It is not 
clear from the ﬁ les or the investigation who took the 
initiative in this case. It likely was an interplay of 
factors; once an oﬃ  cial has a reputation in certain 
social milieus “that he can be inﬂ uenced,” interested 
external parties will seek him out. In the case of green 
cards, the bribers have no interest in maintaining a 
relationship with the oﬃ  cial because, once they have 
the card, there is not much more the oﬃ  cial can do 
for them. Th is is, of course, diﬀ erent for construction 
companies that deal with the oﬃ  cials who grant con-
tracts. In all the cases in which the bribers had an 
interest in maintaining an enduring relationship with 
the oﬃ  cial, they succeeded. 
 In one case, there was a long relationship between the 
“briber” and the oﬃ  cial, but the corruption was lim-
ited to one incident. Briber is in quotes here because 
there were probably no payments involved (the case 
was dismissed by the public prosecutor). Th is case 
revolved around friendship; the opportunity arose for 
one friend to do the other a favor, and she obliged. 
Th e briber has probably not called on the same friend 
again in this way. Unlike the other eight cases, in 
which there was an enduring relationship between the 
briber and the oﬃ  cial, this was not an enduring  
corrupt relationship. 
 It is hard to say who took the initiative in the other 
eight cases, precisely because the bribery took 
place in an enduring relationship. In two cases, the 
initiative was clearly taken by the oﬃ  cial, in two 
others, it was the bribers, but in most cases it re-
mains unclear. 
 Against the two aldermen in this study (who each had 
at least one long, enduring relationship with a briber), 
suspicions also existed that they had actively asked for 
bribes when an opportunity arose in which they could 
help a citizen with a permit or a decree. Th ese alder-
men were working in small municipalities, were domi-
nant in the government of their municipality, and had 
successfully received bribes over a long period of time. 
Perhaps the step toward asking for a bribe, then, be-
comes small. 
 Corruption in nine of the 10 cases was part of a sta-
ble, enduring relationship. Th e briber and oﬃ  cial 
knew each other. Often they were “sort of” friends, 
sometimes even more than friends. An impression of 
the relationships is illustrated in  table  3 . 
 A characteristic of the nine enduring corrupt relation-
ships is conﬁ dentiality within the relationship and 
secrecy toward outsiders. In such a relationship, trust 
plays an important role. Both parties trust that one will 
not jeopardize the other by breaking conﬁ dentiality. 
Th e trust can be built on several aspects. Aﬀ ection 
(sexual relationship, love, friendship, family) can be the 
basis. But trust can also be based on the fact that either 
or both parties can be blackmailed. For example, one 
oﬃ  cial in our study was taken to a brothel by construc-
tion executives, a fact that he wanted to keep from his 
wife. In such cases, extortion vulnerability is evident. 
 In this study, it is notable that parties used aﬀ ection to 
manipulate others. In several cases, former colleagues 
and detectives (from interrogations and interviews, 
respectively), mentioned that the briber had clearly 
“used” the oﬃ  cial and faked a close friendship. For 
example, “[Th e oﬃ  cial] and his bribers were friends in 
the sense that he didn’t have any other friends. But he 
didn’t go out with the bribers, or go with them on 
holiday or anything. And now he has no contact with 
them. It makes you wonder how close these friend-
ships were.” Closer study revealed that in eight of the 
10 cases, the bribers and the oﬃ  cials probably are no 
longer in contact. 
 Table  3  Briber – Ofﬁ cial Relationships in the Nine Enduring 
Relationships 
 Number of Cases Relationship 
1 A love relationship in which the partner 
 of the corrupt ofﬁ cial came up with many 
 relatives and friends in need of visas, 
 which the ofﬁ cial provided. The friends 
 and family, who received the visas on 
 false grounds, can therefore also be seen 
 as (indirect) bribers. 
1 The briber and ofﬁ cial had been friends 
 for a long time before the corruption 
 incidents began. 
2 Aldermen who were more or less friends 
 with their bribers; in one of these cases, 
 the alderman also tried to get bribes from 
 persons he knew less well. 
2 Policemen who received bribes from several 
persons whom they knew pretty well. 
3 The bribers of the ofﬁ cials maintained 
contact with other bribers. The tableau of 
bribers in these so-called corrupt networks 
is much more unclear than in the other six 
cases. 
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 In the six cases that could not be typiﬁ ed as corrupt 
networks, the  personal interests of the briber were at 
stake. (In the few cases in which the briber repre-
sented a private business, he was the owner of that 
business.) Th is contrasts with the cases that were part 
of corrupt networks. 
 From the literature, it was already known that some 
form of trust must exist between the briber and the 
oﬃ  cial.  Höﬄ  ing’s (2002) comprehensive study of 
corruption cases in Germany came to the same con-
clusion. Corruption within superﬁ cial relationships is 
risky. After all, if the person who bribes the oﬃ  cial is 
unknown, he or she cannot be sure the briber will 
maintain conﬁ dentiality. Some trust must exist in the 
relationship between briber and oﬃ  cial. Th erefore, for 
high-income countries, the lower-left cell in  table  4 
will rarely be populated. 
 Corrupt Networks.  Proposition 9:  Corrupt oﬃ  cials, 
including those who operate outside so-called corrupt 
networks, do not limit their corruption to one 
incident. 
 In three of the 10 cases, the corrupt oﬃ  cials were part 
of corrupt networks, which have two characteristics 
(cf.  Höﬄ  ing 2002 ). First, there is an enduring rela-
tionship between the briber and the oﬃ  cial in which 
both parties trust each other. Second, the relationship 
between the oﬃ  cial and the briber is part of a social 
system in which corruption is accepted and excused, 
sometimes even expected or demanded ( Dohmen 
1996 ). If an oﬃ  cial in such a network is replaced by 
someone else, the (sub)system will attempt to mingle 
and socialize the new oﬃ  cial into the system. Often 
there are penalties for those who work in corrupt 
networks but refuse to cooperate (cf.  Anand, 
Ashforth, and Joshi 2004; Dohmen and Verlaan 2004; 
Meeus and Schoorl 2002 ). Because corruption within 
the network is accepted and excused, the corrupt acts 
do not require secrecy within their conﬁ nes. Examples 
of this form of corruption include the recent scandal 
in the Netherlands in the building and construction 
industry and what  Moody-Stuart (1997) calls “grand 
corruption.”  Ashforth and Anand (2003) propose a 
model that explains how corruption becomes normal-
ized in organizations, and  Brief, Buttram, and 
Dukerich (2001) explain how an ethically questionable 
practice can become woven into the fabric of an orga-
nization (i.e., how the normalization and socialization 
processes work). 
 As mentioned earlier, in the corrupt networks of this 
study, there was no clear quid pro quo; the gifts of the 
bribers and the corrupt acts of the oﬃ  cials were not 
exchanged one for one. Th e oﬃ  cials were taken care of 
ﬁ nancially (or in kind through golf trips, dinners) 
over a longer period of time by the briber. And when 
the time came for them to do something for the 
briber, they were expected to do so. 
 Th e three cases in this study that typify corrupt 
 networks all involved construction. Th e corrupt 
 oﬃ  cials were always high on the bureaucratic ladder 
and could make decisions on important projects that 
involved large sums of money. Th e bribers were repre-
sentatives of a private business, usually building 
contractors. 
 Th e types of relationships between briber and oﬃ  cial 
are summarized in  table  4 . 
 Much support for and parallels with proposition 9 can 
be found in the body of research on corporate corrup-
tion. For example, Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi (2004, 
47) argue that in many case studies of corporate cor-
ruption, the questionable behaviors began as isolated 
acts that gained momentum. And Brief, Buttram, and 
Dukerich state, 
 Th e notion that novice wrongdoers will be 
confronted with “pressures to persist” is consis-
tent with a body of research on the escalation of 
commitment. Th is research demonstrates that 
decision makers who commit themselves to a 
course of action tend to add resources in sup-
port of that action in suboptimal ways in order 
to justify their initial decision . . . Th us, people 
may tend to repeat their participation in cor-
rupt practices simply to demonstrate to others 
(and to themselves) that their initial involve-
ment was legitimate. (2001, 488) 
 Conclusions 
 Nine propositions form the main conclusions of 
this article. Th ey sketch a picture of the nature of 
corruption in high-income countries, speciﬁ cally the 
 Table  4  Typology of Corrupt Relationships between Briber and Ofﬁ cial 
 
Stability low: Corruption with 
brief interactions
Stability high: Corruption in an 
enduring relationship 
Isolated corruption: Corruption 
 as deviating behavior
Incidental isolated corruption 
 (situational corruption) (one case)
Enduring isolated corruption (“intimate” corruption) 
 (six cases) 
Systematic corruption: 
 Corruption as the norm
Systematic isolated corruption 
 (daily corruption)
Enduring systematic corruption (corruption network) 
 (three cases) 
 Source: Based on  Höfﬂ ing (2002, 78) . 
648 Public Administration Review • July | August 2008
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Netherlands. Because literature on corruption in high-
income countries is often divided into regions — the 
United States, Northern Europe (which includes 
Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Britain), Southern 
Europe (which includes Italy, Spain, and Greece), 
Australia and New Zealand, and Japan — it would be 
interesting to repeat this study in the diﬀ erent regions 
to see whether the nature of corruption diﬀ ers. 
 In the general literature on organizational misbehavior 
( Vardi and Weitz 2004, 28 ), there is a debate as to 
whether the decision to misbehave is more a function 
of bad apples — the personal characteristics of 
individuals — or of bad barrels — organizational 
and societal variables ( Brass, 
Butterﬁ eld, and Skaggs 1998; 
Treviño and Youngblood 1990 ). 
Th e evidence from the multiple 
case studies in this article supports 
the argument of many social 
researchers (cf.  Hoetjes 1998; 
Vardi and Weitz 2004, 28 ) that 
neither the individual nor the 
organizational and societal 
perspective alone fully explains 
corruption and that integrative 
explanations are most useful in 
explaining behavior in general 
(e.g.,  Bourdieu 1990 ) and corruption in particular (De 
 Graaf 2006 ). It has to be noted, however, that because 
we discuss mainly  cross-case patterns here, we focus on 
discussing  predisposing causes of corruption, not so 
much  triggering causes of individual cases. In order to 
explain corruption by identifying triggering causes, a 
corruption case study design with more emphasis on 
within-case analysis would be better suited. 
 In the literature on corruption, there is much specula-
tion on its nature, but there are hardly any empirical 
qualitative studies on the nature of corruption. 
Knowledge is aggregated far above the level of actual 
corruption cases. Th is might be one reason for the 
confusion in the literature on which anticorruption 
methods work best and most eﬃ  ciently. It may be 
diﬃ  cult to draw conclusions from detailed case stud-
ies, but in order to design eﬀ ective anticorruption 
policies, it is important to expand our knowledge 
beyond what we know from quantitative research. 
Anechiarico and Jacobs state, “Th e right mix of cor-
ruption controls will undoubtedly diﬀ er from govern-
mental unit and from agency to agency within the 
same governmental unit. Moreover, the optimal mix 
changes over time” (1996, 198). More corruption case 
studies should help us with prescriptions and give us 
more information on what the right mix of corrup-
tion control is under speciﬁ c circumstances. Our 
knowledge of the (proﬁ le of the) individual corrupt 
oﬃ  cial needs to be substantiated, as well as his or her 
particular organizational context, relationship with 
the briber, and process of becoming corrupt. In this 
study, a general proﬁ le of a corruption case was cre-
ated from actual cases. One of the things the (explor-
ative) multiple case study methodology allows us to 
do is advance the ﬁ eld by expanding our understand-
ing of the way in which corrupt oﬃ  cials become 
corrupt. 
 Notes 
 1.  Th e point about the uncertainty of the eﬀ ective-
ness of anticorruption policies is an important one 
that  Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) make in their 
comprehensive classic study of New York City. It is 
rich in detail and insights; the authors document 
and analyze the manifold 
liabilities of a vast range of 
corruption control projects. 
Th ey show how corruption 
control mechanisms, which 
might make sense when 
based on general research, 
may not work in a speciﬁ c 
context. 
 2.  Its members are the 
chairman of the Council of 
Procurators-General, the 
head public prosecutor in 
the National Oﬃ  ce of the 
Public Prosecutor, and the head of the National 
Police Internal Investigation Department. 
 3.  Th e interviews included a lawyer who had de-
fended many oﬃ  cials suspected of corruption, 
two journalists who had written many articles 
and books on corruption in the Netherlands, a 
criminologist with much experience in corruption 
research, an integrity consultant with much 
experience with integrity violations in organiza-
tions, a whistle-blower, and an employee of the 
Department of Public Works closely involved in 
the public hearings of a large Dutch corruption 
scandal. 
 4.  Th ere are exceptions. Most notably, in one case, 
the oﬃ  cial received an estimated 1.3 million euros 
illegally. 
 5.  Th e question remains whether this entanglement 
between private and public partners is a typical 
Dutch phenomenon (in Dutch culture, there is 
much emphasis on consensus and cooperation). 
 6.  Th e only exceptions are the cases in which visas or 
immigrations status was expected. 
 7.  A recent alteration of the law in the Netherlands 
changed this. Now it has to be made plausible by 
the accused oﬃ  cial that the gift was not meant to 
inﬂ uence him or her. 
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